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HAIL TO LAW REVIEWS
By PALMER D. EDMUNDS*
In 1937 Professor Fred Rodell, of the Yale Law School, authored an article entitled "Goodbye to Law Reviews.", Professor
Rodell introduced it by saying:
"It is doubtless of no concern to anyone that this is probably
my last law review article. As a matter of fact, this makes one
more article than I had originally planned to write. It was something in the nature of a New Year's resolution. Yet the request
to do a piece about law reviews seemed a golden opportunity to make
my future absence from the 'Leading Articles, Authors' lists a bit
more pointed than would the business of2 merely sitting in a corner,
sucking my thumb, and muttering Boo.'
Having thus sounded the key-note, Professor Rodell launched
into his dissertation by saying:
"There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing.
One is its style. The other is its content. That, I think, about
covers the ground. And though it is in the law reviews that the
most highly regarded legal literature - and I by no means except
those fancy rationalizations of legal action called judicial opinions - is regularly embalmed, it is in the law reviews that a pennyworth of content is most frequently concealed beneath a pound of
so-called style. The average law review writer is peculiarly able to
say nothing with an air of great importance."'
It is not of record that a Lochinvar arose in behalf of the
law reviews to formally accept in kind the challenge thus posed
to their legal erudition and manner of expression. Without a
powerful champion, the proverbial reasonable man might well
have concluded that under such a body blow they were doomed
to succumb. Writers might well have declined to write for their
columns, fearing to identify themselves with those "able to say
nothing with an air of great importance." Nevertheless, writers
continued to take the calculated risk, and wrote. Manuscripts
were transformed into galley proofs; presses rolled out the
pages, and with accelerating tempo the reviews of the nation's
law schools circulated merrily on their way.
In retrospect, it is a fair conclusion that Professor Rodell's
*
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At the

time he wrote, law reviews had hardly emerged from the adolescent stage at which advice, to be heeded, had to be promulgated
with an acrid pen. Professor Rodell returned to the law review
fold twenty-five years later with another article, "Law Reviews
Revisited.'" In the latter he confined himself to a more temperate critique reflecting his relative satisfaction with law reviews as they are today.
Today's law reviews need no formal defenders. They stand
on their own feet and speak for themselves. But if there ever
was occasion for the "Goodbye" to them which has long stood
of record, there is the more occasion today to balance the record
with a "Hail."
WARREN AND BRANDEIS:

"THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY"

In December, 1890, there appeared in the Harvard Law
Review an article entitled "The Right to Privacy."5 It was
written by two Boston lawyers, Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis.
The article was introduced by a quotation from an opinion
of Justice Willes, an English jurist, epitomizing the common
law:
"It could be done only on principles of private justice, moral
fitness, and public convenience, which, when applied to a new subject, make common law without a precedent; much more so when
received and approved by usage.""

Then followed the first paragraph of the article:
"That the individual shall have full protection in person and
in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and
extent of such protecton. Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. Thus, in very
early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference
with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis. Then the 'right
to life' served only to protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the
right to property secured to the individual his lands and his cattle.
Later, there came a recognition of his spiritual nature, of his feelings and intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened, and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy
life - the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the
exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property' has
grown to comprise every form of possession - intangible, as well
as tangible. '"

We recognize this at once as a forcefully written introduction
to a dissertation urging that the time had come for the common
4 48 VA. L. REV. 286 (1962).

54 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
6 Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2312 (1769).
7 See Note 5, supra.
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law to recognize and implement the right to full protection for
man's spiritual nature, in the last analysis the most precious of
all human rights. Up to the year 1890, no such right had been
recognized by common law courts. Doubtless the article was
written with a background of representing the interests of clients who had suffered indignities of a sort for which no relief
at law or in equity had been found available. In its purpose to
bring about a recognition of the right which, in consequence,
Warren and Brandeis keenly sensed, their article exemplified
the contribution which every lawyer owes by way of doing his
part to make the law a better instrument of justice.
In the sense of stimulating legal thinking the article had
a growing impact. But definite results were slow in coming.
Writing nearly fifty years later, Professor Francis N. Bohlen
said:
"Fifty years ago the right which every normal and decent
person feels in living his life to himself appeared likely to be protected by a legal recognition of a right to privacy. Unfortunately
the campaign for its recognition brilliantly begun by the article
written by Justice Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law
Review has almost completely failed."8
But it was not long after Professor Bohlen penned these lines
that the breakthrough came. Court after court recognized the
right to privacy and opened the judicial process to its vindication. The recapituation was aptly made by an alumnus of the
John Marshall Law School, Justice Ulysses S. Schwartz, speaking for the Appellate Court of Illinois:
"Following the lead of Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
whose famous article, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.R.193
(1890), first used the phrase 'right of privacy,' distinguished writers have supported the recognition of the right. Larremore, The
Law of Privacy. 12 Col.L.R. 693 (1912): Pound. Interests in Personality, 28 Harv.L.R. 343, 362-4 (1915); Winfield, Privacy, 47
Law Q.R. 23 (1931); Green, Right of Privacy, 27 Ill.L.R. 237
(1932); Nizer, Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L.R. 526 (1941);
Thayer, Legal Control of the Press, ch. 12 (1944); Feinberg,
Recent developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 Col.L.R. 713
(1948) ....9
"The right is now recognized by the great preponderance of
authority throughout the country. Courts of at least twenty American jurisdictions have explicitly recognized the right either in
direct holdings or well considered dicta ....
Three other states
have statutes recognizing the right." 10
We have here, obviously, an example of how the attention
of the world of common law jurisprudence was brought to focus
on an area of human life which the common law up to that time
had left unprotected. Originating in the minds of lawyers who
8Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. Rv. 725, 731 (1937).

9Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 295, 296, 106 N.E. 2d 742,
743 (1952).
10 Id.at 295, 106 N.E. 2d 742 at 743.
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through experience had come to realize the need, the columns
of a law review afforded a forum for its dissemination and suggestions as to its recognition and amelioration by the common
law. "Christened in the columns of the Harvard Law Review,"
as Professor Sidney P. Simpson put it,1 other legal scholars took
it up in other reviews until the courts recognized its rightful
place in our common law.
CARDOZO: "THIS NEW ORGAN OF EXPRESSION
THE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW"

-

In the course of his lectures at the Yale Law School in 1923,
Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo paid emphatic tribute to the part
that law reviews had come to play in the sound development of
the law:
"More and more we are looking to the scholar in his study, to
the jurist rather than to the judge or lawyer, for inspiration and
for guidance. Extra-judicial agencies are assuming an importance
that increases year by year. Chief of these agencies is the criticism and the suggestion of scholars in the universities and in other
institutes of learning. Until the rise of the modern law school with
its critical method, there was no organ through which professional
opinion could disclose itself effectively and promptly. The universities have given us for the first time a body of critics ever on the
watch. 2 This new organ of expression is the university law review."
Judge Cardozo then went on to particularize:
"I have spoken of the words of Williston and Wigmore which
took the rank of classics almost overnight. Hardly less notable are
which are made month by month in the,
the studies in smaller fields
13
columns of the reviews.'

1

"A recent case in New York will illustrate my meaning and
show the power of the universities to guide the course of judgment," Judge Cardozo said, continuing:
"We had a series of decisions dealing with a supposed rule
:that in actions for specific performance there must be mutuality of
remedy, and mutuality, not merely at the time of the decree, but at
the making of the contract. Some cases, repeating the words of
Fry and Pomeroy, went pretty far in exalting the supposed rule
into one of general application. I have little doubt that if the university professors' had not intervened, the rule would have been
extended by a process of purely logical deduction, and things would
have gone from bad to worse. In the meantime the professors in
the universities became busy, and pointed out where we were tending. Ames started the crusade in an early number of the Columbia
Law Review. Lewis of Pennsylvania strengthened the attack, advancing from a somewhat different angle, in a series of papers in
the American 'Law Register. More recently Dean Stone of Columbia, writing in the Columbia Law Review, exposed the dangers of
the course that many of the courts were following. Finally, Pro11

(1937).

Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. Ruv. 171

M. Hall, Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cordozo, 190 (1947).
is Id.at 191.
12
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fessor Williston. summarized the arguments and the precedents in
his treasury of learning. (3 Williston Contracts, secs. 1433, 1436,
1440). Only the other day, the Court of Appeals reconsidered the
whole subject and put it on a basis which will be found consistent,
so, at least, I hope, with equity, and justice. (Epstein v. Gluckin,
233 N.Y. 490.) But the interesting thing about the episode is the
part that was played by extrajudicial agencies. Without the critical
labors of Ames and Lewis and Stone and Williston, the heresy, instead of dying out, would probably have persisted, and even spread.
It would have gained new vitality with every judgment that confirmed it. Inevitably, too, the process of logic or of development
by analogy would have pushed it forward14into new fields. What
saved the day was criticism from without."

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW

Let us glance at the history of the Harvard Law Review
which, early in its career, so effectively initiated the trend of
juristic thought that culminated in judicial recognition of the
right to privacy. -Its 'first number was published in 1887.
Among those shown at the masthead as student editors were
Joseph H. Beale, Jr., George R. Nutter and John H. Wigmore.
An editorial note following the masthead stated:
"In publishing the first number of the Harvard Law Review
:the editors feel it necessary to offer a few words of explanation.
The Review is not intended to enter into competition with established law journals, which are managed by lawyers of experience,
and have already a firm footing with the profession. Our object,
primarily, is .to set forth the work done in the school with which
we are connected, to furnish news of interest to those who have
studied law in Cambridge, and to give, if possible, to all who are
interested in the subject of legal education, some idea of what is
done under the. Harvard system of, instruction. Yet we are not
without hopes that the Review may be serviceable to the profession
at large."

thpfs

15rcb

The first number contained two leading articles - one by
Professor James Barr Ames on "Purchase for Value without
Notice," and.,the other by Joseph H. Beale, Jr., on "Tickets."
Professor Ames, one of the profession's greatest scholars in all
fields of the law, was later to become Dean of the School. It
would seem that Beale was "jumping the gun" in authoring a
leading article, for 1887 was.the year of his graduation from
the School. But the generations of: students who thereafter
sat in his classroom in Conflict of Laws and other subjects can
understand that even as a neophyte he could have held his own
in fast company. Of the others mentioned above, it would be
a work of supererogation to discourse about John H. Wigmore,
another scholar in; all, fields of -law, whose broad erudition is

manifested in. his "Panorama .of the World's Legal Systems."
Later Dean. of the Northwestern University School of Law, he
14id.
15 1 HARv.

.

L.REv!-35 (1887).
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is probably best known today for his monumental treatise on
evidence. George R. Nutter entered the firm of Warren and
Brandeis as an associate, later became a partner, and the firm
became an outstanding one of the Boston Bar.
Also in the first number of the Harvard Law Review were
"Notes on the School" and extracts from a lecture by Professor
Ames on "Choses in Action." A letter at some length from
Washington, D.C., commented on decisions of the United States
Supreme Court at its October Term, 1886. There were comments on a number of recent cases, and several book reviews.
As we have outlined the content of the first number of the
Harvard Law Review, it would seem to have established a pattern which it has rather consistently maintained through the
years, and which has been followed by the many law reviews
which were later established throughout the country. The pattern includes (1) leading articles on subjects of current importance and interest, grounded on scholarship and knowledge in
the field under consideration; (2) commentaries on current important judicial decisions and developments in the law; and
(3) review of current books on legal subjects. And it established, of course, the pattern of student participation. Warren
and Brandeis attained professional eminence without having
had opportunity for law review experience, because the Harvard
Law Review was not established until after their graduation.
But it is reasonable to say that Beale, Wigmore and Nutter,
and other student editors who might have been named, gained
much from their Law Review experience. In passing, mention
might be made of the names of other student editors, taken at
random from later volumes of the HarvardLaw Review. Among
them are Norman Hapgood, who transferred his legal talents to
the world of literature; Henry Upson Sims, legal author and
past president of the American Bar Association; Thomas W.
Swan, former Dean of the Yale Law School and Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals; Charles E. Hughes, Jr., son of
the Chief Justice of the United States and an eminent member
of the New York Bar in his own right; Robert A. Taft, likewise
a son of a Chief Justice who left a successful legal career to become a leader in American politics; Clarence B. Randall, who
turned industrialist and became president of the Inland Steel
Company; Robert P. Patterson, Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals and Secretary of War; Raymond S. Wilkins, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts; Dean
Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States; Archibald
MacLeish, who like Norman Hapgood, transferred his talents to
literature; Louis L. Jaffe, scholar in the field of administrative

1967]

Hail to Law Reviews

law and a professor at Harvard Law School, and Edwin N.
Griswold, presently Dean of the Harvard Law School. A glance
through the masthead entries of the law reviews of other institutions would, without question, likewise reveal a rich treasury
of names of lawyers who have distinguished themselves in the
legal profession, and, in the process, have uplifted the profession
and the law.
The benefit of student training through law review participation is not, however, restricted to those who have subsequently
achieved pre-eminent public and academic fame or recognition.
From student experience on a law review staff, all profit including the vast majority who accomplish their everyday service to
the bar and the public quietly and without fanfare.
EARLY PROFESSIONAL LAW JOURNALS
With the advent of the HarvardLaw Review, followed from
time to time by the entry into the area of reviews from other
law schools, the ultimate demise of the "established law journals
managed by lawyers of experience," referred to abovelo in the
first number of the Harvard Law Review, was inevitably foreshadowed. Today's lawyers do not know such publications, save,
perhaps, as the American Bar Association Journal has some
measure of their qualities. One of the oldest of the "established
law journals" began publication, in 1866, as the American Law
Review." It ceased publication in 1940. Others of the old
private law reviews had succumbed before then. The law school
reviews had come to cover the field so thoroughly that there was
no longer a place for the privately edited journals, however
high their standards might be.
One finds a fascination in turning the pages of the old law
journals and noting their content. Much of the material is unsigned. On the first page of Volume 5 of the American Law
Review, dated Boston, October 1870, begins an article, "Codes,
and the Arrangement of the Law." There is no name attached.
But at the top of the page, above the printing, appears the following, written in red ink: "Note: This Article is undoubtedly
written by 0. W. Holmes, Jr." One reading the first few sentences can hardly avoid sensing the Holmes "touch":
"It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first
and determines the principle afterwards. Looking at the forms of
logic it might be inferred that when you have a minor premise and
a conclusion, there must be a major, which you are also prepared
then and there to assert. But in fact lawyers, like other men, fre16 See text at note 14, supra.
17 In 1929 this journal was reorganized and continued publication as the
UNITED STATES LAW REVIEw. Under a subsequent reorganization it became

the NEw YORK LAw RE IEW.
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quently see well enough how they ought, to decide on, a given state
of facts without being very clear as to the ratio decedendi. Lord
Mansfield's often-quoted advice to the business man who was suddenly appointed judge, that he should state his conclusions and not
-give his reasons, as his judgment would probably.be right and the
reasons certainly wrong, is not- without application to more educated courts." 18
"BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION" IN ILLINOIS

In the Book Review section of this same Volume 5 of the
American Law Review there appears a review of a brochure
containing the Constitution of the State of Illinois "as adopted

in Convention, May 13, 1870, and submitted to the people for
adoption or rejection at an election to be held July 2, A.D. 1870,
and the Address of the Convention accompanying the same."
The unsigned comment, dealing specifically with a number of

its provisions, manifests a spicy quality 'which is not beyond
the appreciation of those who,. read it nearly a century later:
"Under the head of the Legislative department, we, find that a
very stringent oath is required of members of the General Assembly against bribery and corruption, which we have no'hesitation in
saying will be a complete failure. When legislators reach that pitch
of depravity at which they become accustomed to -bribery and corruption as part of the ordinary course of legislation (and this
point we understand the legislature of Illinois to have reached)
their consciences do not any longer stop at such trifling stumbling
blocks as oaths. One would think on reading the oath prescribed
that the Convention supposed the corrupt law-giver would, on the
presentation of it, succumb at once to the voice of conscience, turn
pale as ashes, and, grovelling in the dust, sue for mercy. For our
own part, we incline to think that he will do something very, different - he will in all cases take the oath."
The reviewer then brought to bear the judgment of the

"statesmen" who framed the Constitution of the United States.
Continuing, he said:
"But this is a matter of minor importance. In its haste to
remedy some of the more crying evils of the present, the Convention seems to us to have forgotten a primary maxim of constitution
making, that constitutions must consist of general principles and
not of special laws. What would the statesmen of 1787 say to such
constitutional provisions as these: '25. The General Assembly
shall provide by law that the fuel, stationery, and printing paper
furnished for the use of the state; the copying, printing, binding
and distributing {he laws and journals, and all other printing ordered by the General Assembly, shall be let by contract to the
lowest responsible bidder, but the General Assembly shall fix a
maximum price.' . The people of the United States would have been
rather astonished, we fancy, if the instrument submitted in 1787
had contained a provision as to statutory contracts, or the expenses•
of furnishing the capitol." ..

The reviewer looked with a critical eye upon the provisions
for the elective process:
.
"We are somewhat surprised to see that the,'elective principle'
18 5

AM. L. REV. 1 (1870).
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is retained by the new constitution in full force. All the judges of
the supreme, circuit, county and probate courts are to be chosen by
the people. Even in Chicago this is to continue, although that city
is probably quite as unfitted for the practice by the nature of its
population as is New York, where its failure is confessed. Perhaps
Vanderbilt and Fisk may yet teach Illinois the lesson which New
York seems to have learned too late. The profession will be glad
to know that the Supreme Court reporter, at any rate, is selected
by the court, and not at the polls."
Finally, the reviewer expressed concern as to the number of
"accomplished statesmen" in Illinois:
"On the whole, it may be said of the new Constitution of
Illinois, that it abounds in negative rather than positive provisions, provisions rather calculated to hedge the powers that have
been abused than to establish new ones. This, from one point of
view, is an advantage. It is unlikely that a new state, like Illinois,
contains a large number of accomplished statesman, and she is
much safer in the hands of law-givers who are willing to stand
supra antiquas vias than she would be if her government were to be
used as the corpus vile, for the experiments of empirics and dreamers. 'Thou shalt not' has often been found in politics as in religion
a safer ordinance than 'thou shalt.' "19
A look at the subscription rolls of the American Law Review
in 1870, when these comments were written, would probably
have disclosed but few Illinois names. A state short of its quota
of "accomplished statesmen" could hardly have been over-served
by lawyers who looked for enlightenment to the columns of a
law journal published in the East. That it was at pains to
publish a careful appraisal of a document lacking in direct intest to most of its constituency is indicative of the comprehensive
coverage attempted by the. professional journals of the time.
Certainly the editors of the American Law Review could not
have anticipated that what was said would increase the popularity of the journal in Illinois.
THE ALBANY LAw JOURNAL -

FORENSIC ELOQUENCE

Another highly regarded professional law publication was
the Albany Law Journal. In its introductory number, January 8,
1870, appeared the following notice:
"The undersigned will commence, on the 8th day of January,
1870, the publication of a law journal, to be issued weekly under
the above title. It is not the intention to make the Journal a "Law
Report" merely, but a medium of conveying to the profession of
the country the latest intelligence of interest on all subjects pertaining to the law. Each number will contain valuable and original
articles on subjects of general legal interest; discussions of Law
Reform; reviews of important decisions; a digest of the latest decisions of the courts of this and other states and of the United
States courts; also of the English decisions of interest in this
and
country; a collection of the general legal news of the week,
carefully prepared reviews of new works on legal subjects. ' ' 2
19

Id. at 110.

20 1 ALBANY L. J. 2 (1870).
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It is apparent that a general pattern was established here which
was followed by the Harvard Law Review. The pattern was a
natural one: "Original articles on subjects of general legal interest," "discussions of Law Reform," "reviews of important
decisions," "carefully prepared reviews of new works on legal
subjects" - all stood to be of interest and benefit to the profession.
In the Albany Law Journal,as in other old law publications,
the browser is rewarded by considerable content, obviously held
in high esteem a century ago but which is not found elsewhere
in print at a juncture when the conquest of outer space appears
to inspire more interest than the solution of many mundane
problems, and mechanical computers are being groomed to supersede the workings of the human senses. For example, the
editorial in the first issue of the Albany Law Journal is entitled
"On the Study of Forensic Eloquence," and at some length comments on the need for better presentation of cases to court and
21
jury.
The editorial follows with some sound advice as to how to
cultivate the art. The writer was setting down his thoughts at
a time when forensic eloquence truly related only to courts and
juries. Practice before administrative tribunals, even in small
degree, could not have been within his conception. Courts and
juries remain today; persuasion of administrators calls for appropriate forensic eloquence in the use of the written as well as
the spoken word. Forensic eloquence has played a major role
in the drama of the law since the days of Demosthenes, trials
before the Greek dicastery, and Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric.
Few of today's lawyers would not be more effective if they were
capable of evidencing a more persuasive degree of forensic eloquence, oral and written, than they are equipped to demonstrate.
But it would be far from the thought of the editors of modern
law reviews to give space to commentaries on the subject. It is
a tribute to the thoroughness of treatment which our legal literature has given to all aspects of our law and procedure that
he who is interested can find helpfully suggestive material in the
matter, albeit in pages yellowing with age.
21 Id. at 3.
"There is another essential, aside from a knowledge of the
law, for the successful court lawyer - that is eloquence; that sort of eloquence which Blair defines to be 'the art of speaking in such a manner as to
attain the end for which we speak.' Many young men, who study with a view
of coming to the Bar, have an ambition, more or less strong, to become advocates - to be able to convince judges and persuade juries by the power of
their logic and the graces of their style and utterance; but a visit to our
courts is but too likely to show how lamentable the great majority of them
fail of achieving their desire. Lack of perseverance in performing the labor
necessary to the student of elocution, or ignorance of the method to be pursued, or, in many cases, a notion that orators, like poets, 'are born, not made,'
has served to make the number of eloquent advocates very small indeed."
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We would expect to find in Great Britain, also, professional
legal publications of the kind referred to in the first number of
the Harvard Law Review as "established law journals." There
were, indeed, such. An example is the Juridical Review, published in Edinburgh, Scotland. In the Prefatory Note of its
first issue, in 1889, the editors stated:
"The object of this Review will be to record accurately and discuss
impartially subjects relating to the science and practice of law and
politics.

.

.

. A critical record of the leading decisions of the

Supreme Courts in Scotland and England is intended to be one of
its prominent features, and will be intrusted to gentlemen who have
made a special study of the branches of law to which such decisions relate.

. . . Its columns will be open to the jurists and pub-

licists of all parts of the United Kingdom, India and the Colonies,

and also to those of the Continent and of America. .. . The editors

will endeavor to make the Review a chronicle and guide for current
legal and political literature ... "22
The leading article of the first number of the JuridicalReview was by David Dudley Field, author of the Field Code which
instituted code pleading in New York in 1848, and was entitled
"Codification in the United States." In its leading article makeup, its "Critical Record of the Leading Decisions," and its endeavor "to make the Review a chronicle and guide for current
legal and political literature," the editors announced a policy in
broad conformity with that of its American counterparts, although going beyond them in introducing the element of politics.
In this latter regard, however, perhaps they were only somewhat in advance of the times. Today's student of Administrative Law finds law and politics inextricably intertwined. Did
not Chief Justice Hughes say: "Legislative agencies . ..work
in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands. ' 2 3 In the So-

viet conception, law is politics.
IN LIGHTER VEIN

Not all of the old professional magazines for the legal profession were completely serious in their content. Among those
which were not was the Green Bag, established in 1889. On its
masthead appeared the rather frank announcement, "A Useless
But Entertaining Magazine for Lawyers." A sample of its
humor:
"The late Judge Keogh was 'a fellow of infinite jest.' When he first
went on the circuit as Judge of Assizes he was entertained in
state by his bar, and the evening was passed in dignified decorum,
as grave compliments were exchanged on both sides. The 'counselors' present were made to feel that their old comrade had become a judge. At ten o'clock, to their amazement, he rose, thanked
22 1 JURIDICAL REV. 1 (1889).
23 St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 52 (1936).
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them for their hospitality, made a solemn bow, and retired, leaving
them in blank consternation at the complete change. In five minutes a face beaming with fun appeared at the door. 'Boys, the
Judge has retired for the night, but Billy Keogh won't go home
till morning.' A roar of laughter and
24 applause greeted the return,
and the mirth was fast and furious."
Again:
"At a legal investigation of a liquor seizure, the judge asked on unwilling witness: 'What was in the barrel that you had?' The reply
was, 'Well, Your Honor, it was marked 'whiskey' on one end of the
barrel and 'Pat Duffy' on the other; so I can't say whether it was
25
whiskey or Pat Duffy was in the barrel, being as I am on my oath.
But the Green Bag had its serious side, as evidenced by the

following, deserving of being taken to heart by legal writers in
general:
"The Chicago Legal News, in reviewing Beach on Wills, puts forth
the following curious idea: 'The usefulness of many law works is
injured by an undiscriminating over-citation of authorities.' The
reviewer probably meant that the usefulness of many law works is
injured by an indiscriminate citation of authorities. There can be
no such thing as an over-citation of authorities in a legal treatise,
provided the authorities are in point. The citation of an additional
case in support of a proposition from the court of last resort of the
smallest jurisdiction, like Delaware or Rhode Island, will afford
assistance to lawyers in that jurisdiction. The time has gone by
when lawyers will accept as law, except on the most obvious proposition, the statements of authors not well fortified by the citations of
authorities."26
THE ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Let us look at the beginning of law reviews nearer in point
of time and geographical proximity. The Illinois Law Review
commenced publication in, 1906. John H. Wigmore was named
as faculty editor. The first issue contained the following introductory note:
"Undoubtedly the field for law reviews of a general character is already overcrowded. Moreover, it must be conceded that such reviews, however excellent, enlist the interest of but a small minority
of the practicing lawyers of Illinois. It is believed, however, that
there is genuine and widespread need for a live periodical primarily
devoted to the discussion and exposition of Illinois law, and of matters of special practical value to the Illinois Bar. In that belief,
and with the purpose of supplying that need this Review is
launched.
"The salient features of the Review, as contemplated by the
Editors, may be enunciated as follows:
1. Articles on legal subjects of live interest to the bar and
people of the state. 2. Articles on the history and status of important problems and doctrines in the courts of this state. 3.
Monthly Digest of the current decisions of Illinois Appellate Courts.
4. Articles and symposiums on proposed constitutional amendments
and law reform. 5. Reviews of the work of the state legislature at
24

1 GREEN BAG 84 (1889).

25 Id.
26 Id. at

86.
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the close of each session. 6. Reports of committees of state and
city bar associations and selected addresses delivered before said
associations. 7. Addresses delivered in the course on Legal Tactics
in the Northwestern University Law School. 8. Critical comment
on important decisions of Federal and Illinois courts, and in some
instances of the courts of other states. 9. Review of law books of
interest to the Illinois Bar. 10. Announcements of the Northwestern University Law School and notes of matters of interest to its
alumni ."27
In its inception, as its name almost necessarily implied, the
Illinois Law Review was designed to be primarily a local publication, serving Illinois lawyers. Its general program followed
the same pattern of content that we have seen established by
the Harvard Law Review and the professional journals before
it - articles on subjects of current interest, comments on cases,
and book reviews.
Although it was not directly emphasized, the leading articles published in the first three numbers dealt, for the most
part, with matters of procedure, indicating that in 1906, over
half a century ago, enlightenment was strongly needed in that
area of the law. Since that time Illinois has come from common
law and chancery pleading to the Civil Practice Act, but there
is little doubt that even under such a "simplified" system of
procedure, today's Illinois lawyer finds procedural problems exacting and frustrating in a degree fairly comparable to those
troubling his professional brother at the turn of the century.
There is now no "Illinois" Law Review to assist him. Years
ago, it departed from its provincial perch, and under the name
of "Northwestern" University Law Review took its place with
the reviews of other University law schools pointed to serving
the profession generally.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Coming closer in point of time, the University of Chicago
Law Review was established in 1933, and its first number appeared in May of that year. Dean Harry A. Bigelow wrote an
Introductory Note:
"The issue of this, the first number of the University of Chicago
Law Review, marks another step in the growth of the school. The
Review will have a double purpose harmonious with the character
and aims of the school itself. The Law School has, in general, two
points of view: that of a school of national scope with interests as
broad as the whole field of the law, and that of a school situated
in the city of Chicago and consequently having a very direct and
vital interest in the legal problems of the city and state in which
it is. Both these points of view and these interests
will be mani' 28
fest in the various departments of the Review.
27 1 ILL. L. REV. 39
28 1 U. CH. L. REY.

(1906).

110 (1933).
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In the course of the Introductory Note, Dean Bigelow emphasized the part to be played by the students:
"The Review is primarily and essentially a product of the student
body. It, of course, has and will continue to have the whole-hearted
endorsement and assistance of the Faculty, but the responsibility
of the Review29 and the credit for it will belong to the students of the
Law School.

Also, he said that "the main divisions of the magazine will constitute a carefully considered adaptation of the arrangements
generally prevailing in law reviews." 80
THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW QUARTERLY

We come now to the John Marshall Law School itself, and
the John Marshall Law Quarterly,the first number of which appeared in December, 1935. The late Dean Edward T. Lee provided a Foreword:
"The John Marshall Law Quarterly makes its first appearance with
this number, and a word of explanation may be in order to justify
the advent of another legal publication, which may hope to add to
the learning and excellence of other law school journals and magazines. Law students and lawyers are peculiarly persons of impression and expression. During the law course and during practice
lawyers are engaged chiefly in receiving impressions from teachers, from their reading, and from their active practice. Expression
in student years is very limited and this may be so during many
years of practice and yet the power of expression, orally or in writing, is the most valuable possession of a lawyer. His chief function
is to impart to his client, and to the court, and to the jury his understanding of the law. And however much legal knowledge he
may have imbibed as a student or in his later years at the Bar,
unless he can express his learning clearly, precisely,
and convinc'
ingly, his store of knowledge may be unproductive." 31

Dean Edward T. Lee projected for The John Marshall Law
Quarterly a scope and content in general conformity with that
established by the professional law journals of the century past,
and adopted by the law reviews of the law schools as they later
appeared. We have noted his reference to "legal reform." We
have noted a like reference in the introductory number of the
3 2
Albany Law Journal.
The same key-note was struck in the introductory numbers of the Illinois and University of Chicago
Law Reviews, and was implicit in the initial number of the
Harvard Law Review. Reform of the law has been a consistently expressed objective of the law journals and reviews from
the beginning. Those who were privileged to know and work
closely with Dean Edward T. Lee know how close to his heart
was the matter of true legal reform. The columns of The John
29d at 111.
AId.
31

32

Q. (1935), Foreword.
See text at note 20, supra.
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Marshall Law Quarterly, during the years that it was published,
bear ample testimony to his concern and action.
In carrying out a program which in general followed that
employed by other law reviews, although placing considerable
emphasis on the law of Illinois, The John Marshall Law Quarterly gained a position of high esteem in the legal profession.
It came to be regarded as an excellent working tool for the
practicing lawyer.
THE ILLINOIS LAW FORUM

In 1949, the University of Illinois Law Forum made its debut. In the Foreword of its first issue, the late Dean Albert J.
Harno stated the aim of the Forum to be:
"To keep the discussions close to the urgent problems of the profession, and to shape the materials of the periodical so that they will
offer the highest attainable measure of help for the members of the
bar in the solution of their problems and in the advancement of law
improvement."ss

He also spoke of the plan ... that each issue of the publication will be devoted to a single topic with various phases of
'8
it presented in a symposium."'
Like The John Marshall Law Quarterly, the content of the
University of Illinois Law Forum was slanted strongly towards
the Illinois lawyer, and has so continued. This is well exemplified by the 1966 Summer and Fall Issues. The Summer, 1966,
issue is given over (apart from student notes, comments
and recent decisions) to Part I of a Symposium on Illinois
Criminal Procedure, in memory of Dean Albert J. Harno. The
Fall, 1966, issue is given over to Part II of the Symposium.
Through the years its volumes have evidenced a consistent adherence to the originally stated policy of devoting each issue to
a single topic. In their symposium parts these volumes constitute a repository of legal information of great value to Illinois
lawyers. The student notes and comments add the elements
which are common to all law reviews.
A LATE ARRIVAL:

THE U.C.L.A. LAW REVIEW: PROSSER

In the year 1953 a law review was established at the Law
School of the University of California at Los Angeles. A number of jurists were invited to make introductory comments for
publication. William E. Prosser, Dean of the Law School at the
University of California wrote:
"No major law school is now without its law review. There are a
great many; but so dispersed and disparate is the vast field of
American law, and so various are the law schools, that no two of
33 1949 U. ILL. L. FORUM, Foreward.
84
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them serve exactly the same function. . . .. Essentially a law review is the expression of what a law school itself has to say to the
world. It is one of the means by which the school makes its in*fluence felt by those who make the practice and administer the
law.
"A law review is the only place where the decisions of the courts
can receive calm, enlightened and friendly comment and criticism.
Here the binding force of precedent is less oppressive; any fear
of popular opinion is removed; the urgency of time is not so acute;
and aspects of the question which may have been overlooked or
minimized under the pressure of a busy court may be examined
at length in something approaching ' leisure, and called to the attention even of the courts themselves."'
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: "WITHOUT LAW
REVIEWS, A GREAT VOID IN THE LEGAL WORLD"
Ten years later, in 1963, the editors of. the U.C.L.A. Law

Review again invited comment. Chief Justice Warren, of the
Supreme Court of the United States, whose -affirmation appeared
in the first number, was again invited. He replied:
"As you enter your tenth year of publication and increase the annual number of issues, you invite me to dedicate the November issue of Volume 10. You call attention to my statement in Volume
I: 'The American Law Review properly has been called the most
remarkable institution of the law school world,' and you ask 'have
your views modified during your years as Chief Justice?',
"It is normal and almost 'inevitable for the views of individuals
to be modified as they view life and legal problems from a different
vantage point. Sometimes they change theii views. At other times
their earlier views. are strengthened, and so it is with me. So far
as law reviews are concerned, my views are strengthened. If it
were not for their critical examination; 'we would have a great void
in the legal world. Courts would have few guidelines for appraising the thinking of scholars and students or of the bar itself. It is
largely through them that we are able to see ourselves as others
see us.
"In these days of emotion-packed issues which reach our courts,
it is highly important that we have the discussion and enlightened
criticism of their decisions and opinions. The courts are not
plagued by lack of criticism, but they do suffer from an abundance
of criticism based on animosity to the result without objective
scrutiny of the facts, legal principles and precedents involved. The
latter kind of criticism cannot be attributed to the law reviews.
While they are our greatest critics, and properly so, they match
precedent with precedent, principle with principle, and reason with
reason. So conducted; criticism becomes of inestimable assistance
to the courts and cannot do other than raise the standards of justice throughout the land. Very often a law review article concerning a current court decision will: start a chain reaction in our law
schools, which, in the aggregate, will explore the facets and implications in that decision far beyond what can properly be discussed by a court under any given state' of facts. Such reactions
are truly informative to bench, bar and the public,. as well as to
the students for and by whom law reviews are published. For the
latter, they constitute a foundation for that self-imposed discipline
which is essential to a sound legal career."'
5 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 2 (1953).
36 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1962).
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In the literature of free men there may be found many
ringing and inspiring statements. Many of these relate particularly to the procedural side of our legal system. Referring
to the attitude of our constitutional framers, Justice Brandeis
said that ". . . protection of the individual, even if he be an
official, from the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power was
then believed to be an essential of free government. ' '3 7 That the
achievement of this desideratum was to him dependent in large
measure upon proper procedures was made clear by his pronouncements in many cases, and by his succinct conclusion that
".. . in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. ' 38 Justice Douglas
said:
"It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of
the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.
is our main
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards
assurance that there will be equal justice under law."3 9
Procedural principles essential to the freedom of men thus embodied in the Bill of Rights, were implicit in Magna Carta. A
substantial portion of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of
the year 1641 was given over to "Rites, Rules and Liberties concerning Judicial proceedings," containing forty sections.4 0 The
basic importance of legal procedure in maintaining human freedom has been emphasized throughout the whole course of our
common law jurisprudence.
It is entirely fitting that a law review should make this
area of our law its primary concern. As The John Marshall
Journal of Practice and Procedure picks up the thread that ties
it to The John Marshall Law Quarterly of former years, its aim
is to do just that.
Hail to law reviews!
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Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,'295 (1926) (dissenting opinion).

asBurdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
39 Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179
(1951) (concurring opinion).
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